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A new economic geography of finance is emerging,
and the current “financialization” of contemporary
economies has contributed greatly to the reshaping of
the economic landscape. How can these changes be
understood and interpreted, especially from a territo-
rial point of view? There are two contradictory eco-
nomic theories regarding the tangible effects of the
rise of the finance industry.According to neoclassical
financial theorists, the finance industry’s success is
based on its positive effects on the real economy
through its capacity to allocate financial resources
efficiently. An alternative approach, adopted here,
posits that finance does not merely mirror the real
economy and that the financial economy, far from
being a simple instrument for the allocation of
capital, has its own autonomy, its own logic of devel-
opment and expansion. A series of complex, and
sometimes contradictory, connections link financial
markets and the real economy, and there are some
tensions between them, calling into question the
coherence of the regional and national economies that
follow from them. Moreover, the territorial approach
shows how the mobility/liquidity of capital and the
changing dimensions of new regions and countries
are central to the finance industry’s functioning. This
article builds an understanding of the financial
system through the lens of pension funds and high-
lights the impact of such a system on the real
economy and its geography.
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Over the past 20 years, banking systems and finan-
cial markets have been restructured while playing an
increasingly influential role in contemporary econo-
mies. As a result, a new economic geography of
finance is emerging, and the current “financialization”
of contemporary economies has contributed greatly to
reshaping the economic landscape. How can these
changes be understood and interpreted, especially
from a territorial point of view?This article deals with
the changing geography and structure of the finance
industry and the subsequent impact of these transfor-
mations on the economy and society.
There are two contradictory economic theories of
the concrete effects of the rise of the finance industry.
According to neoclassical financial theorists, the effi-
ciency of the financial markets, their transparency, and
the complete mobility of capital allow for a more
efficient allocation of means and consequently better
returns on productive capital. Essentially, the finance
industry’s success is based on its positive effects on
the real economy.
An alternative approach, adopted here and inspired
by the Ecole de la régulation (Aglietta 1998; Orléan
1999; Boyer 2000; Lordon 2000; Chesnais 2001),
posits that finance does not merely mirror the real
economy and that the financial economy, far from
being a simple instrument for allocating capital, has
its own autonomy, its own logic of development and
expansion. A series of complex, and sometimes con-
tradictory, connections link financial markets and the
“real economy,” and there are some tensions between
them, calling into question the coherence of the
regional and national economies that follow from
them.
This article is based on a study of the way in which
Swiss pension fund assets are managed, the channels
through which they circulate, and the principles that
drive them (Theurillat, Corpataux, and Crevoisier
2006a). Indeed, the financial markets’ increasing
power has, on various occasions, been linked to the
concomitant expansion of institutional investors, such
as pension funds (Clark 2000, 2003; Clark and Hebb
2004; Engelen 2003; Montagne 2006). In common
with Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, and with the
Netherlands in continental Europe, Switzerland is an
economy in which pension funds manage a consider-
able portion of household savings. However, in Swit-
zerland, pension funds appear to be largely dependent
upon the country’s main financial players.
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This article uses the Swiss case to develop a more comprehensive and general under-
standing of the finance industry’s functioning and to highlight the consequences of such a
system on the real economy and its geography. What is the value of this approach? As
regional scientists, we were amazed by the fact that in Switzerland, since the beginning of
the 1990s, innovative regions in manufacturing or tourism, where there are dynamic
networks of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and adequate research and
training institutions, remained among the poorest in the country. For us, this situation was
contradictory to contemporary theories about territorial innovation models (see, e.g.,
Benko and Lipietz 1992; Moulaert and Sekia 2003). Conversely, financial centers were
enjoyinggreat prosperity.Their influenceon the economy, aswell as onpolitics and society,
was growing. At that time, we began to suspect that the most important dividing line
between successful regions and others no longer ran between innovative and noninnovative
regions but between financial innovation systems and innovative systems in the real
economy. Since then, we have tried to understand theoretically and empirically the
functional and territorial relationships between finance and the real economy.
At a theoretical level, our approach aims to provide an understanding of the finance
industry’s autonomy.This means that despite changes in networks and players and the
decreasing returns that are occurring in finance (as in any other industry), the finance
industry managed, at least until 2008, to maintain its own dynamic and unity thanks to its
capacity for integrating specific innovations within the broader context of the economy
and the society.
This approach was designed primarily during a period of expansion with the aim of
understanding the long-run development (and possible decline) of the finance industry.
Nevertheless, it also explains, in part, the periodic “boom-and-bust” dynamics of finan-
cial markets. With the current financial crisis, most financial theorists and commentators
seem to have rediscovered and, above all, denounced the intrinsic instability of financial
markets. The originality of this article lies in the fact that it shows that finance, like any
economic activity, relies on some intrinsic fragilities even in a period of “good weather.”
As of January 2009, the boom-and-bust dynamic had attained epic proportions and will
certainly have a lasting impact on the real economy. It has clearly become a systemic
crisis. The open question is whether we are facing only a new crisis within the accumu-
lation regime, as has happened several times during the past 20 years, or a turning point
from a period of expansion to decline—in other words, a real change of regime.
This article is divided into three parts, each corresponding to a step in the description
of the finance industry’s autonomy. The first part constructs a general and territorial
definition of the finance industry and identifies its limits with the rest of the economy. To
do so, we review a number of approaches that link the financial sphere, the real sphere, and
territory, with a focus on the literature on the “financialized accumulation regime.” We
conclude this section by presenting a functional and territorial definition of the finance
industry, based on capital mobility/liquidity, and by differentiating between financial and
real principles on the basis of differences in management criteria.
The second part describes the specific internal and external innovation processes that
allow the finance industry to maintain and develop within the framework of the real
economy. This part is based mainly on case studies of Swiss pension funds and their
operations between 1992 and 2004 and their links with the finance industry. Beyond these
case studies, we describe certain developmental strategies by the Swiss finance industry.
Specifically, we show how the finance industry’s expansion into new spaces and sectors
goes hand in handwith an internal drive to standardize/complexify financial products; this
process is originally and simultaneously born of transparency and opacity, as well as of
the increasing division of labor and skills centralization. Thus, for example, geographi-
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cally extending investments into emerging countries creates opacity, while encouraging,
for example, further knowledge of emerging markets; this knowledge is developed in
financial centers and builds on existing skills. Internal and external processes are two
faces of the same coin. According to this approach, autonomy is how the finance industry
survives and expands, thanks to its exchanges with the real economy. A large part of this
article is devoted to identifying this boundary and process.
Finally, the conclusion demonstrates how these processes have connected spatially and
temporally over the past 20 years. This picture allows hypotheses and questions to be
formulated regarding the limits of the financial industry’s expansion. A growing number
of sectors and countries were integrated into the financial sphere during that period.
Sooner or later, the finance industry will see decreasing returns, which will outweigh its
internal capacities to expand within the economy and society.
A Territorial Definition of the Autonomy of the
Finance Industry
This section presents an initial summary of the financialized accumulation regime.This
approach exposes the extent to which the present situation is characterized by the primacy
of the financial markets in the accumulation of wealth. Nevertheless, a regime of accu-
mulation can never cover the entire economy and society. Therefore, we focus closely on
the theoretical distinctions between the financial economy and the real economy. In this
respect, we show how entities, such as SMEs or regional economies, are only partially and
imperfectly covered by this accumulation regime. Next, we review works that have linked
financial strategies and territory, indicating that the finance industry appears to be an
essentially spatial industry, since it builds and exploits the mobility/liquidity of capital
within space.Then, we explain the boundaries between the financialized economy and the
real economy, highlighting the different approaches to the way in which these entities
work. Finally, we describe the autonomy of the financial sphere and its different relation-
ships with the rest of the economy and society.
The Accumulation Regime
According to some writers who are close to or affiliated with the Ecole de la régulation
(Aglietta 1998; Orléan 1999; Boyer 2000; Lordon 2000; Chesnais 2001), an accumulation
regime based on finance (defined as a financialized accumulation regime or a financial-
ized growth regime) apparently succeeds the regime that is based on mass production and
consumption (the Fordist regime). In the Fordist regime, finance was subordinated to
productive industrial capital and largely took the form of bank credit. Finance was
strongly “controlled” through different types of regulations, and competition among
banks did not take center stage as it does today. Economic policies were based on “cheap”
money, and banking institutions did not implement high-profile policies of market
segmentation or those that were based on credit scoring (Leyshon and Thrift 1999) to
differentiate among the various actors. In such a context, securing bank credit was
relatively straightforward and available to most businesses. Finance is now increasingly
acting as an autonomous force, imposing higher financial profitability criteria (Morin
2006). Today, large financial players, in conjunction with the financial market and the
most important listed companies, represent the main institutional form taken by accumu-
lation. Thus, capitalist accumulation occurs through financial markets and consists of the
continuous growth in market rates (Lordon 2000) and in the capitalization of financial
markets. Therefore, according to Orléan (1999, 214) “contemporary economies are
mainly characterized by having taken financial power to previously unattained levels and
having put this power at the very centre of their accumulation regime.”
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The increasing power of group savings plans and the concentration of their manage-
ment in the hands of institutional investors was probably the most significant change
in the financial system (Boubel and Pansard 2004). Indeed, contrary to the idea that
shareholding by households would favor a larger dispersal of power in the economy, it
appeared that households were most likely to be controlled by the financial intermediaries
that managed these funds, that is, banks, insurance companies, and pension funds. By
the late 1970s, institutional investors in the United States had become the prime
movers within the financial world and were soon managing the majority of financial
assets. Since then, these same investors have invested their money mainly in the financial
markets.
Following regulation theory, an accumulation regime lasts a certain number of years
(say 20 to 40 years) and occupies a certain space (made up of several countries). If the
Fordist regime involved the 30 years after World War II and covered the Western
Hemisphere, one can wonder whether today’s financial crisis is a crisis within the
financial accumulation regime or whether it is the final crisis of this regime.
The Financialized Accumulation Regime Covers Only Part of the Economy
and Society
A regime of accumulation can never cover the entire economy and society (Boyer
1986). It covers only the part that is characterized by the capitalist means of production,
that is, the part that revolves around the accumulation of wealth. Over time,
various sections of the economy have escaped this system or have been inadequately
integrated into it. For the regulation school, as well as for historians like Braudel (1985),
capitalism is characterized by large organizations, monopolies, and opacity, rather than by
market mechanisms and transparency. Thus, sectors or parts of sectors with a strong
presence of SMEs, like agriculture or tourism in continental Europe, as well
as the governmental or paragovernmental sector, the arts, and so forth, are all orga-
nized either wholly or partially around principles that are different from capitalist
accumulation.
This delineation between the dominant accumulation regime and the rest of the
economy means that large businesses and SMEs do not participate in the financialized
accumulation regime in the same way: the former are well connected and integrated,
whereas the latter are more or less disconnected. Put more simply, there are, on the one
hand, multiestablishment groups, multinationals and multilocals, whose heads are well
connected in the financial world and who know how to use financial resources to develop
their activities and external growth. On the other hand, SMEs find it much more difficult
to access finance industry resources and, in some cases, can no longer manage to finance
their growth without sacrificing their independence (Crevoisier 1997; Corpataux and
Crevoisier 2005). However, this is not a fixed barrier, and the pressure of financialization
has led a vast number of SMEs to be bought by big groups, a procedure that has ensured
their participation in the financialized accumulation regime (Chabanas 2002; Crevoisier
and Quiquerez 2005).
This dichotomy between large firms and SMEs is fortunately not completely static.
Many financial innovations, such as buyouts by large listed groups, initial public offerings
(IPOs), venture capital funds, and private equity funds, are aimed at a better integration
of SMEs. This point is particularly relevant here, since the expansion of financialization
is one of the areas that this article sets out to explain. Within the various industry sectors,
a similar pattern has emerged. The past few decades have seen the increasing financial-
ization of areas, such as telecommunication, energy companies, infrastructures, and
property, that were not previously financialized or were little financialized.
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The Finance Industry’s Territorial Approach
If the previously mentioned approaches are important because they put the financial
markets at the heart of their analysis, they nevertheless generally overlook the issue of
space. In contrast, the thesis advanced in this article puts space at the heart of the finance
industry’s dynamic. This relationship works in both directions. On the one hand, finance
is essentially an industry that creates and organizes the mobility of capital in space. On the
other hand, it has a considerable effect on the economy, in general, and on its geography.
It not only influences the spatial direction of financial flows but ultimately transforms the
geography of productive activities and spatial hierarchies. In this section, we build a
territorial understanding of the finance industry and define the boundaries between this
industry and the real economy.
The Construction of Capital Mobility/Liquidity. In contrast with real capital
and traditional long-term direct financing, the financial markets are characterized by their
liquidity. Real capital (machines, buildings, communication and transportation infra-
structures, as well as skills and product branding) is not mobile or has lowmobility, which
means that those who hold it are subject to the social constraints of proximity. Liquidity
mitigates the risk that the immobility of capital carries by giving the holders of capital the
possibility of withdrawing from investments at any stage (Orléan 1999; Lordon 2000).
From a geographic point of view, what is liquidity if it is not the mobility of the property
of securities (Billaudot 2001) between an increasing number of players who participate in
this expanding space in which property titles are traded? This is what we have referred to
as the increase in capital mobility/liquidity (Corpataux and Crevoisier 2005), since the
liberalization of the movement of capital goes hand in hand with the development and
liquidity of the financial markets.
Two types of territorially based institutional reforms have been implemented to create
capital mobility/liquidity: the removal of regulatory impediments to the free movement of
capital between regions and nations and the strengthening of operational and informa-
tional financial market efficiency, thanks to transparency and high-quality public
information.
To go from real to financial capital, a certain number of transformations are required,
transformations that are related to territory (e.g., borders, institutions, networks, and
nodes). First, it is imperative that the control of real capital be formalized through
securities (e.g., equity and shares).Themobility and profitability of these activities should
then be encouraged by setting up an institutional framework (e.g., the removal of
boundaries and taxation legislation that supports transactions); technologies (financial
markets are among the main consumers and promoters of information technology and the
integration of telecommunications; O’Brien 1992); and, of course, specialized agents
(e.g., financial sector businesses, stock exchanges, specialist media, training and research
institutes, and consultants). These transformations allow the financialization of economic
activities, that is, the continuous evaluation of economic investments by financial markets
(Orléan 1999). It is possible systematically to compare financialized financial assets, as
well as to disengage at short notice from the economy’s financial space. The finance
industry is therefore a fundamentally spatial industry.
Note that this definition of the finance industry is restrictive. Traditionally, the financial
sector has been defined by actors (e.g., banks, insurance companies, financial companies,
and pension funds) or by functions (providing financial means to companies). Our
definition stresses the role of financial markets and of the mobility/liquidity of capital. For
example, a local bank that provides traditional property loans that are based on traditional
long-term deposits would not be included in this definition.
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Finance and Regions. Finance, especially international finance, is now an activity
that is spatially hierarchical, with jobs and decision-making powers more and more
concentrated in some urban regions. Genuine financial centers, or “global cities” (Sassen
1991), have emerged, so that local managers in a few major financial centers frequently
decide on the geographic distribution of investments.According to Dow (1999), the quest
or preference for liquidity favors spatial centralization and concentration, on the one hand,
and contributes to the decline of traditional local banking systems and consequently
weakens the power to create money within peripheral areas on the other hand (Dow and
Rodriguez-Fuentes 1997).
Today, pension funds account for a substantial proportion of these savings and are thus
competing with banking establishments on what was traditionally their exclusive turf.
Martin and Minns (1995) showed that in the United Kingdom, although savings are
collected homogeneously throughout the territory by pension funds, financial institutions
that are based mainly in the southeast of the country invest these assets chiefly in the
London stock exchange and only in listed companies—essentially large companies. In
practice, little is reinvested in other regions of the country.
The consequences of this considerable modification of financial channels for the
economic and spatial development of a country are not negligible. Access to capital is
made easier for some but more difficult for others. All this, of course, has serious
consequences for regions in which SMEs prevail (Dow 1999; Pollard 2003; Klagge and
Martin 2005). The absence or the progressive disappearance of traditional finance chan-
nels in these regions will, sooner or later, lead to the acquisition of prosperous SMEs by
big businesses, often from outside the region. This situation will, in turn, lead to a
decrease in regional decision-making autonomy and, consequently, in centers of accumu-
lation (Crevoisier 1997).
The central issue is that financialization expands geographically from financial centers.
More regions may gradually become better integrated, thanks to financial innovations and
expansion through IPOs, the buying of SMEs by large groups, and the like. At the
international level, countries have been gradually opening their borders and developing
their financial markets and the liquidity of their companies. These expansions have
proceeded in an uneven and selective way. Venture capitalists or business angels may
target only SMEs in “fashionable” sectors, such as dot.com companies or high-
technology firms with high expected future returns (Dubocage and Rivaud-Danset 2006).
The same goes for regions; being located in the southeast of England, for example,
appears to improve one’s chances of raising venture capital considerably (Martin, Berndt,
Klagge, and Sunley 2005). The same mechanisms are observed in “emerging market”
countries.
Until now, we have defined financialization by the progressive construction of the
mobility/liquidity of the capital of firms, sectors, regions, and nations thanks to financial
markets. This movement has diffused across the economy following various paces
among regions and sectors. Today, it still does not encompass the entire economy. To
distinguish the financialized economy and the remaining part of it, one needs opera-
tional criteria.
Differentiated Management Criteria. When the finance industry constructs and
exploits the mobility/liquidity of capital in space, it invokes specific management prin-
ciples and criteria (returns and risk), with their own temporal and territorial characteris-
tics. Modern financial theory, drawn from Markowitz (1959), is based on managing
portfolios of assets. Thereafter, the goal has been to maximize returns and minimize risk
and to invest in assets whose evolution is not statistically correlated (Sauvage 1999;
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Rainelli-Le Montagner 2003). However, finance is characterized by a particular concep-
tion of the notions of returns and risk (see Table 1), which is distinct from that used in the
real, nonfinancialized economy.
In real economics, returns refer to the accumulation of capital, controlled over time,
that is, according to economic cycles, whether they are short (a production cycle, for
example) or long (product cycles or technological cycles). For the financial economy,
returns are not modeled on real cycles (i.e., on actual duration) but on continuous
comparisons with returns on other investments on the financial markets; the evaluation
principle for the financial markets is therefore permanent and disconnected from the
often-lengthy production time (Orléan 1999). In short, a long-term commitment is
substituted with the threat of departure, of short-term defection. Accumulation over time
is replaced by mobility in space. That is, the stakeholder gives way to the shareholder
value; a commitment to a real estate or industrial project, which entails particular risks
and issues, is replaced by a purchase agreement for standardized shares.
The definition of “sufficient” or “insufficient” returns depends on the basis of com-
parison, the basis of calculation, and the valuation time frame. For instance, in finance
industry terms, the losses sustained through investments in shares in the crises of
2000–2001 and 2007–2008 should not be strictly considered an error. The error lies in
having lost more than the market indices or in not having adequately diversified one’s
portfolio. Rather, the performance of a market portfolio should be compared with real
direct investments, carried out without recourse to financial channels, over a period of 15
to 20 years. Such comparisons are rarely made. They are rendered even more difficult by
the fact that returns are not calculated in an identical manner. There are therefore returns
and returns, and there is no evidence that investments, such as in unlisted SMEs, are less
profitable than are financialized investments.
In real economics, the risk taken by an entrepreneur is difficult to rationalize when
viewed simply as a formula.The entrepreneur takes a gamble on the future, and that future
is not perfectly known or knowable. This uncertainty was classified as “radical” by
Keynes (Moureau and Rivaud-Danset 2004) and is reserved for situations in which the
Table 1
Comparison of Investment Criteria Between Real and Financialized Investment Channels
Investment
Criteria
Real Economy Financialized Economy
Basis of Calculation
Spatial and
Temporal Factors Basis of Calculation
Spatial and
Temporal Factors
Return
(Yield)
Expected future
project returns
Time frame for real
project, accumulation,
place where project
is located
Comparison with
market indices
(over- or under-
performance)
Instantaneous and
comparable
profitability in a
globalized,
financialized channel
Risk Industrial or
technological risk
or one linked to
market for goods
and services
Linked to where
project takes place
Probability can be
calculated and reduced
by diversifying among
asset classes and
between countries
where trends are
uncorrelated
Creating an area mix
with uncorrelated
patterns and trends
that is financialized
Source:Authors’ evaluation.
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outcome is unknown or, at the least, cannot be expressed as a probability; it is articulated
by the impossibility of enumerating all future “states of nature” (Sapir 2000). From this
perspective, the future is, by definition, considered to be fundamentally opaque (Hugon
1990; Lordon 2001).
In financial theory, the term risk is applied to situations in which the result is imper-
fectly controlled but for which all outcome scenarios are considered to be known from the
outset.According to this assumption, it is possible to attribute a probability of occurrence
to each situation and thus predict and calculate the future (Moureau and Rivaud-Danset
2004; de Goede 2001). In terms of financial share portfolios, it is therefore possible to
reduce the risk through diversification between asset classes between the nations or
regions for which the returns are not correlated. Diversification means investing not only
in different sectors, but in countries whose economies are developing at different rates.
To diversify is to bring together places and territories.
In financial economics, within the financialized sphere of the economy, the risk-returns
dichotomy corresponds to a solution to a financial engineering exercise. In real econom-
ics, returns and risk are understood in relation to the particular spaces and times in which
production and economic cycles take place.
In standard financial theory, finance is merely a reflection of evolutions in the real
economy (Orléan 1999); its activity, in a world without barriers, can be defined simply as
allocating productive capital without the real economy suffering any concomitant disrup-
tion. For our purposes, finance is not this mirror automaton described by standard
financial theory, nor are the relationships that exist between finance and the real economy
as neutral and unilateral.
In brief, as the financial community continues to develop its own increasingly distinct
investment criteria, representations, and behaviors, we will see that the finance industry
has taken on a life of its own and is expanding and developing its hold over the rest of the
economy. Indeed, this era of liberalized and global finance seems to herald a new dynamic
of financial expansion, a new “spatial fix,” to quote Harvey (1982)—that is, a new means
(never enduringly successful) of resolving capitalism’s inherent crisis tendencies, an
ever-renewed attempt to find new sources of the enhanced profits that capitalists always
seek.
Finance Industry Autonomy and Swiss Pension Funds
This section explores more deeply how the finance industry developed within the
economy and society during the past 20 years. Using the Swiss case, we identify specific
processes of expansion. One can distinguish between internal processes that account for
the internal capabilities of the industry to regenerate and external processes that charac-
terize the way in which the finance industry expanded in the economy.
First, we present the qualitative and quantitative study of the use of Swiss pension
funds. From the collection of savings to final investments, the pension funds management
industry is multilayered and integrated at each level into the finance industry. Conse-
quently, the autonomy of the finance industry could be determined by examining the
relationship between the finance industry and the environment in which it is evolving and
the internal dynamics of the industry. Finally, the conclusion considers the limits of the
financial industry’s expansion, which may be deduced on the basis of its operating
principles.
Swiss Pension Funds: Rising Figures
Swiss pension funds have experienced continuous growth since the 1980s, since the
generations who make up their capital currently outnumber those who are drawing their
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annuities.As of 1998, these savings had outstripped the gross domestic product.Through-
out the 1990s, the pension funds’ portfolio profile changed, and an ever-increasing
proportion of the money that they manage now passes through the financial markets. In
fact, the combined quantity of shares and bonds has regularly increased, going from 44
percent of overall wealth in 1992 (SFr 113 billion, or US$100 billion at 21 March 2009
rate) to 63 percent in 2004 (SFr 307 billion, or $272 billion). This has been to the
detriment of less liquid assets, such as direct property holdings, loans granted to employ-
ers who are members of the fund, and mortgages (see Figure 1).
How do Swiss pension funds fit within the finance industry, and have they now become
autonomous financial players? Moreover, to what extent has the emergence of these new
players changed the financial channels and the types and locations of investments that are
made? These are the questions we attempt to answer on the basis of recent, nationally
funded Swiss research on how, where, and through which channels Swiss pension funds’
assets were invested (Theurillat, Corpataux, and Crevoisier 2006a).
Case Study Methodology
Themethodological approach of this case studywas initially developed using data from
both the (Swiss) Federal Statistics Office (OFS) between 1992 and 2004 and from
privately collected data on Swiss institutional investors (Lusenti 2003; Robeco 1998,
2000, 2002; and Swissca 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004) between 1997 and 2005. These data
allowed us to create typologies of pension funds, identifying their location and the
location of their various functions. Typical investment portfolios were also identified.
From these typologies, it was possible to draw precise maps of the locations of the real
estate portfolios of pension funds. Regarding shares and bonds, broader spatial categories
(like within the country and abroad) categories could be devised.We also collected a large
amount of “gray literature” from professional associations and trade unions.
35
40
30
20
25
15
1992
2000
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5
10
0
Shares Bonds Property Other assetsInvestments
with employers
and mortgages
Figure 1. Pension funds investments in 1992, 2000, and 2004 (SFr millions). Source: OFS
(given data basis 1992–2004).
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In addition, some 20 semidirective interviews were conducted in 2005 with various
players. The idea was to get experts from each successive step of the circuit: pension fund
managers (of large and smaller funds, of public and private funds) and asset managers of
the three main banks that managed pension fund savings (UBS, Swiss Credit, Swiss-
canto), as well as other financial institutions, such as private banks (LODH and Pictet) and
insurance companies (Zurich and Helvetia Patria). The main objective of these in-depth
interviews was to identify the location and strategies of each player and how they interact
with each other along the circuit. While the interviews with pension fund managers were
aimed at gaining an understanding of the investment decision making and criteria,
the interviews with financial players focused on investment processes, products,
and locations. The interviewees were usually general directors or operational directors
of the companies with a broad view on activities. The interviews lasted one to two
hours.
Furthermore, a panel of 13 experts—not only experts from pension funds and from the
finance industry but also such critical players as consultants, an expert in investment in
SMEs, and a representative of a foundation that specializes in promoting ethics in the
financial system—gathered on two occasions.Theymet in 2004 to confirm the hypotheses
and identify relevant sources of information and respondents. For the second meeting, in
December 2005, they received two preliminary versions of our synthesis—one about real
estate investments and the other about investments in financial markets—and reviewed
the research results to reinforce the relevance of the study’s conclusions. These meetings
were highly interesting because players from the entire chain discussed their mutual
interactions on the basis of the findings of our research. Putting this information together
allowed us to build a picture of the global governance of pension funds assets (Theurillat,
Corpataux, and Crevoisier 2008). It appeared clearly that the finance industry is, by far,
the most powerful player in the management of pension funds.
To further extend this research, this article infers a more general representation of the
functioning of the finance industry. Of course, the savings managed by pension funds are
not the only “raw material” used by the finance industry, but they are one of the most
important. Thus, we believe that the general model developed here is relevant, even if
further confirmation of its validity would be useful.
Results
The Pension Funds Sector
Between the savings and final investments areas, there is a whole intermediate man-
agement channel that has considerable influence over the use of pension funds. On the
basis of the work of Martin and Minns (1995) on the spatial organization of the United
Kingdom’s “pension fund” industry and on Clark’s work (2000, 2003), which put the
industry’s operations in different Anglo-Saxon countries (the United States, the United
Kingdom, and Australia) into perspective, we built a picture of the industry in Switzer-
land. The value chain, from fund collection to final investments, can be divided into four
levels (see Figure 2).
Once savings have been collected, involving contributions from both employees and
employers (the first level), the second level is administrative management of pension
funds (fund-localization centers and payment of benefits). The third level is asset man-
agement, which may be conducted by the pension fund itself or delegated to a specialist
company, and at the fourth level are investments. It is worth reiterating that this article
deals solely with securities investments (i.e., largely funds that invest in equities and
bonds), rather than real estate investments, which are primarily made outside the financial
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market (Theurillat, Corpataux, and Crevoisier 2006b), unlike securities, which are mainly
dealt with by financial players at both management and investment levels.
In summary, the entire pension funds’ securities investment industry has a funnel-
shaped structure (Theurillat, Corpataux, and Crevoisier 2006a) (see Figure 3).At the first
level, pension savings are collected in a relatively uniform manner throughout Switzer-
land through the spatial distribution of jobs. At the second level, the administrative
management of pension funds is relatively concentrated within the country’s five main
cities: Zurich, Basel, Bern, Geneva, and Lausanne. This spatial distribution of pension
funds can be largely explained by the location of private and public employers. If one
relates the funds’ administratively managed wealth to employees in the region, one can
see that the main urban areas are greatly overrepresented (see Figure 4).
At the third level, savings, direct and collective, are managed primarily in a largely
centralized manner by a few companies that are based in Zurich and Geneva. Only the
large funds for large public and private companies, which are based mainly in the
country’s major economic centers or, to a lesser extent, in the principal towns of cantons,
could be considered autonomous financial players. Nevertheless, even if they have the
skills to manage their funds themselves, they prefer to outsourcemost of themanagement.
These large funds generally employ a few in-house managers to make their investment
decisions and generally knowwhere they are investing. In contrast, several thousand small
funds outsource everything because they have no in-house skills and rarely know where
their money is invested. Therefore, although pension funds are financial players, the
majority of them are extremely passive and dependent on the country’s main banking and
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financial companies. Investment decisions thus tend to bemade in a centralized way, since
they are largely delegated to financial institutions that are mainly attached to domestic
banks in Switzerland: private Swiss banks (30 percent), large national banks (UBS and
Credit Suisse with 28 percent), and cantonal banks (17 percent). Foreign banks and
financial institutions have only a small share in the institutional management market
(15 percent) (Robeco 2002).All the wealth management departments of these businesses,
as well as the majority of the investment companies, are based in Zurich or Geneva.
The fourth level is a sectoral and territorial concentration of investments. Indeed, in
2004, funds invested a total of SFr 151.7 billion ($134.5 billion) in securities in the
domestic market. While it is difficult to know Swiss pension funds’ exact portfolios of
bonds and equity, the setup of the two Swiss markets indicates that the typical fund
portfolio includes shares from four companies (Novartis, Nestlé, Roche, and UBS), since
they constitute 56 percent of the Swiss Performance Index (SPI), along with bonds from
four types of issuers, since they make up over 80 percent of the market. Of course, funds
could opt for secondary securities. In reality, this direct route is much underused. In 2000,
pension fund investments in SMEs represented only 1 percent of assets (Puhr 2003). On
the Swiss shares and bonds stock market, it is the major players in the public (national and
cantonal) and private (large SPI businesses) sectors that attract the majority of pension
fund financial investments.
It is also worth noting that the banks and affiliated financial services that make 24
percent of the SPI added an estimated value of 14.4 percent to the national economy and
represented just over 5 percent of total national employment in 2003 (Département fédéral
des finances 2006). In other words, investments through the financial markets favor large,
listed companies and the two main financial centers in Switzerland. The outlying areas,
which specialize in traditional activities like manufacturing and tourism, only partially or
indirectly benefit from the financial markets.
External Dynamics of the Finance Industry’s Expansion
The previous section described the networks, players, and geography of Swiss pension
funds. This section further develops the description of the finance industry that controls
(i.e., maintains and develops) these networks for its profit. The aim of this section is to
infer a more general framework for understanding the finance industry from the Swiss
case.
Over the past 15 years, the finance industry has experienced autonomous growth within
the framework of the economy and society. Thus, the financialized accumulation regime
is typified by a continuous increase in market rates (Lordon 2000). However, on several
occasions, such as in early 2000 and since mid-2007, the markets have experienced
significant bearish periods, although until July 2008, they have always recovered.
Autonomy is thus characterized by internal processes that allow external relations and
exchanges. In this case, the finance industry is faced with a number of transformations,
such as the standardization of its products, the increasing ubiquity of available financial
information, and the trivialization of its skills. These processes are counterbalanced by
the industry’s internal innovative capacities (which are discussed in the following
section) and the innovation capacities that correspond to the external expansion of the
industry toward the rest of the economy. This external expansion is heading in two
directions:
• On the one hand, downstream of the industry, on the investment side, the financial
markets’ control over the real economy is growing in two ways: geographic expansion
and the appropriation of new sectors, such as real estate.
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• On the other hand, upstream of the industry, a periodic reshaping of the legal
framework has encouraged new capital flows into the financial markets and is partly
responsible for the finance industry’s growth.
These phenomena define the forces outside the finance industry and its expansion toward
the rest of the economy and society.
The Enlargement of Spaces Influenced by Liquidity. From 1992 to 2004,
pension funds’ investments through the finance industry and the financial markets were
characterized by two changes. First, the proportions of equity investments rose from 11
percent to 27 percent of the total wealth (peaking at 33 percent in 2000). Second,
investments became significantly internationalized, with the international proportion
rising from 26 percent to 51 percent of the total (see Table 2).
Moreover, there has been an indirect but huge internationalization of investments
through large Swiss companies into which SFr 151.7 billion ($134.5 billion)
were invested in 2004. Most of these companies’ activities are outside Switzerland.
Ultimately, only the domestic bonds channel allows for a certain amount of national
and regional investment, since all the rest goes abroad. This geographic expansion is
logical from the point of view of both the quest for liquidity and the diversification of
portfolios.
Occupation of New Sectors. These forces seem to have helped promote the
occupation of new sectors, particularly since the stock market crises of 2000–2001.
Property investments have, therefore, now become a highly desirable asset class to which
the same return/risk financial investment criteria are attempting to be applied (Theurillat,
Corpataux, and Crevoisier 2006b). In addition to the property sector, which allows for the
diversification of investments, there has been an increase in so-called alternative invest-
ments over the past few years. Indeed, investments in hedge funds, private equity, or
venture capital—previously considered extremely risky—are now recommended for
pension funds. According to the interviews, a growing number of Swiss pension funds
have added these alternative investments to their portfolios. Changes in Banque Pictet &
Cie’s LPP index (see Table 3), as well as the inclusion of previously separate hedge fund
and private equity investments (which represented SFr 11.7 billion ($10.3 billion), or 2
percent of the total wealth, in 2004), and the most recent Swiss national statistics
confirmed this trend (OFS 2006).
Table 2
The Geographic Expansion of Swiss Pension Fund Investments (SFr millions; percentages in
parentheses)
1992 2004
Switzerland 83,511 151,730
(74%) (49%)
Foreign countries 29,573 155,235
(26%) (51%)
Total 113,084 306,965
(100%) (100%)
Source: OFS (given data basis 1992–2004).
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In short, these varied investment options are an integral part of any self-respecting
assets portfolio. The work of asset managers consists mainly of comparing the risks and
returns of increasingly numerous asset classes and the increasing number and reaches of
geographic markets.
The Industry’s Growing Hold Over Household Savings. The finance industry
is also expanding upstream of the industry, which goes from savings to final investments
(see Figure 1), to ensure from the start that savings move toward the financial networks.
In the case of Swiss pension funds, this movement is essentially evidenced in changes in
the legal framework. Indeed, the triptych of return, risk, and liquidity is part of current
Swiss federal legislation governing the investment criteria for pension funds. The con-
struction of mobility/liquidity and the “institutionalization” of contemporary financial
vocabulary and principles as enshrined in law since the 1990s have allowed the finance
industry to impose its management criteria and consequently to use its “risk/return
framework” in such a way as to allow systematic spatial and sectoral comparisons.
Essentially, these changes have engendered a change in the perception of risk away
from the real economy’s traditional criteria (direct property holdings and loans granted to
employers) toward the diversification of financial portfolios (the extension of foreign
investment limits, use of alternative products, and collective funds). They have also
institutionalized the need to delegate fund management to professional financial compa-
nies. Finally, they have obliged pension funds to use accounting standards that are based
on market values. In summary, over the past 15 years, the finance industry has seen,
through legislative changes and the increasing application of its management criteria, the
institutionalization of its worldview and principles.
The Internal Dynamics of the Finance Industry
In the previous section, we described the way in which the finance industry has
expanded within the economy, downstream, through geographic expansion and the
integration of new sectors, and, upstream, through formatting, which favors financial
logic within institutions. Of course, this external expansion assumes that there are also
internal capabilities to do so.This section, based again on the case of Swiss pension funds,
shows that the finance industry is based on three internal phenomena that allow it
periodically to overcome the limitations faced by the industry as it expands in time and
space.
Table 3
LPP Index of Banque Pictet and Cie in 1993 and 2005
Investment Types
1993 2005
Monetary market Bonds in Swiss currency
Bonds in Swiss currency of Swiss issuers Bonds in foreign currencies
Bonds in Swiss currency of foreign issuers Swiss shares
Bonds in foreign currencies World shares
Swiss shares Swiss property
Foreign shares World property
Hedge funds
Private equity
Commodities
Source: Banque Pictet & Cie (1999, 2005).
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The Standardization/Complexification Paradox. In common with most other
business sectors, the finance industry’s products and services are simultaneously under-
going a process of standardization and a process of innovation/complexification (see
Engelen 2003 for a similar view). Shares, bonds, classic investment funds, and the like
have become relatively commonplace. Greater common accessibility and standardization
are generally associated with lower management costs. Nevertheless, to maintain profit
margins and returns, the finance industry has, over the past 20 years, periodically
launched new financial products on the market. These products are, a priori, more
complex and should, in principle, guarantee or, at least, offer the promise of a better
return.
Thus, certain products and investment vehicles, which until recently were the exclusive
domain of specialized investment companies and considered highly sophisticated and
risky (such as hedge funds, securitized real estate, commodities, and emerging markets),
are now fashionable and are offered by most banks throughout Switzerland, either
in-house or externally (through partnerships with specialized companies). These invest-
ment products and vehicles are an integral part of any self-respecting portfolio of assets
and are thus starting to become “standard” products. So if standardization and complexi-
fication go hand in hand, the second strategy, linked to the first, requires that the various
assets be comparable in terms of risks and returns.
Emergence of Transparency and Opacity. The finance industry requires trans-
parency to allow products from different asset classes to be compared in terms of their
returns and risks. This information means that, in principle, it is possible to compare an
investment in a Russian mining company with an investment fund with a selection of
bonds and equity in real estate. Transparency is crucial to ensuring liquidity. Paradoxi-
cally, this constant demand for transparency, that is, standardized and public information,
leads, according to the evidence, to a concomitant growth in opacity.
For instance, with pension funds, the product innovation/complexification process, the
expansion process (through the appropriation of new sectors with increasingly specific
characteristics), and the geographic expansion process (through the internationalization
of investments) are all factors that create opacity. Moreover, even within the framework of
traditional investments, such as securities, pension funds use several asset managers to
compare and set them up against each other. This diversification by managers results in it
being difficult to determine a fund’s final investments (such as businesses and sectors).
Nevertheless, fieldwork shows that, paradoxically, an increase in the number of exter-
nal mandates does not necessarily lead to a diversification of final investments. Indeed, the
various external managers generally adopted similar investment plans; this is increasingly
the case even in the Swiss market, since it is highly concentrated and offers only a few
different possibilities.
Finally, it is worth reiterating that information is rarely a matter of hard facts; rather, it
is something that is first constructed and then interpreted (McSweeney 2001) by
agents with strategic aims who therefore mold the facts to suit their own ends. This
information is then subject to often wildly divergent, often contradictory, interpretations.
Finally, there will always be manifest differences between the way the financial industry,
with its greater competence and more reliable information sources, uses information and
the way other industries do so. In summary, although this belief in transparency may be
at the heart of the financial markets’ operations and the industry strives unstintingly to
generate and maintain it, it is also constantly called into question by the industry’s very
dynamic.
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Growth in the Division of Labor and Centralization of Skills. The processes
thus far described (diversification of sectors and spaces, innovations, and the like) are
possible only insofar as the financial sector develops new internal skills and new faculties
for generating and processing information. The industry has, therefore, seen a noticeable
increase in the number of players, in the division of labor, and in outsourcing at all levels,
and particularly within those areas, where more specialized skills are developing.
As part of this process, there has been a noticeable increase in the activities of
independent consultants, to the detriment of the traditional consultants affiliated with
banks or insurance companies. Independent consultants provide a range of services, from
actuarial services to reporting the results of investments, as well as selecting and assessing
managers (Robeco 2002).
At the territorial level, most of these new services have emerged in the financial centers
of Zurich and Geneva—a situation that echoes Sassen’s view (1991) that one of the two
main functions of the global city is financial innovation. The complexity, number, and
breadth of skills are expanding as financial centers become more concentrated. Clearly,
financial competence develops from specific areas within financial centers. The financial
markets’ increasing power, the growth of capital mobility/liquidity, and the endogenous
dynamic of the finance industry are all factors that seem to conspire in favor of the
concentration of financial activities and allow themain financial centers to practice spatial
tradeoff (Leyshon andThrift 1997) among the regional, national, and international. These
financial markets have hence concentrated power for creation of wealth and a vast
capacity for spatial tradeoff, which allows them constantly to reevaluate invested capital
and reallocate it to any financialized place on the planet, in accordance with standardized
criteria.
Conclusion
The rise of the finance industry has probably been the one economic change with the
greatest impact on the geography, economy, and society of industrialized countries over
the past 20 years. In this article, we have developed the idea that finance is not simply a
reflection of the real economy but that it has a life of its own and has to be considered an
autonomous system within the rest of the economy and society.
As with any industry, the finance industry has encountered decreasing returns, notably
the standardization of its products, the ubiquity of publicly available financial informa-
tion, and the trivialization of its skills. Over the past 20 years, it has remarkably managed
to overcome these tendencies, thanks to its capacity for innovation. Internally, it has
developed new products, new skills, and new zones of opacity in which its expertise still
matters. Externally, the development of the finance industry has corresponded to the
spatial expansion of financialization toward new countries and to its increasing depth of
penetration through the financialization of more sectors and players.
This intellectual framework is a territorial understanding of financial accumulation and
of its impact on the real economy. It allows the formulation of some new hypotheses and
questions regarding the directions and possible limits of this accumulation.
First, innovation is crucial to the finance industry, since it permits investment in
increasingly distant areas and new sectors, as well as the development of increasingly
complex products. This innovation therefore enables any fall in profits caused by the
standardization of financial products to be overcome and partly compensates for the
growing cost of control across larger and larger distances, in an ever-increasing number
of countries, as well as for the greater difficulty in financializing new sectors. However,
this control is becoming ever more expensive and complex.
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Second, as we have shown, financialization has also developed upstream by shaping
national institutions to create important national savings and orienting them toward
finance industry networks. Over the past 20 years, many countries have developed such
savings schemes, and several important countries, such as Germany, are considering
whether to introduce them. This progressive integration of spaces has undoubtedly
contributed to the rise of financial capitalization and helped to keep prices and indexes
rising.
How far will this upstream expansion extend?There may still be considerable potential
for pension funds (or other such schemes) to develop in European, Asian, or emerging
countries and thereby to fuel the finance industry, but there may also be social and
political limitations.
Third, there is the important question of expansion into new territories. In a closed
economy, the return on invested capital and that behind annuities depends mainly on the
state of the economy in question and the date of annuity payments. An annuity is simply
a right to a portion of national production, the level of which is largely determined by
changes in productivity throughout the period. Put simply, pension funds have a vested
interest in investing in the regional and national economy to make it more productive and
to be able to pay out good annuities.
In an open economy, in which the finance industry builds narrow bridges between all
the financial markets, the question needs to be framed differently. Investments should
allow the deduction of annuities from the selected countries’ future production. The
“economic bet” is therefore different. One is, in fact, substituting a bet on the future of the
national economy with a bet on one elsewhere.
This maneuver could be justified by the national economy’s insufficient absorption
rates. Clearly, the strong growth of pension funds could not be completely absorbed by the
Swiss economy without leading to inflation on capital goods (real estate, equity, and so
forth). Nevertheless, this article has also demonstrated that certain spaces and businesses
have been privileged, while others have been excluded. The absorption rate, therefore,
also depends on investment criteria. How long will institutional investors remain confi-
dent about financial markets and their spatial interdependences and internal periodic
instability? Once again, territory appears to be a way to tackle these issues.
Since 2003, certain large Swiss pension funds have invested directly in large infra-
structural projects within the country to avoid the risks inherent in financial markets.
Some financial players who developed special nonlisted funds sought to finance SMEs or
local real estate development. These ideas were also developed abroad (see, e.g., Engelen
2006). No doubt, the present turbulence in financial markets will reinforce such strategies
to escape from financial markets.
Finally, one open question about the validity of the model presented in this article is its
capacity to explain the current financial crisis. The model was developed between
2004 and 2007, a period of strong expansion. Nevertheless, several properties of the
autonomy of the finance industry can help us understand the current crisis. First,
the financialization of new assets on the U.S. real estate market was typical of the
downstream expansion of sectors with its growing difficulties. The securitization of risks
related to the subprimes within complex structured products, also typical of the internal
innovation capacities of the finance industry, increased the level of opacity. These
products were sold to distant financial investors worldwide, investors who were looking
for geographic and sectoral diversification of their portfolios. The crisis instantaneously
affected European and Asian financial players. Nevertheless, it took nearly one year to
transmit the shock to the real economy, which shows the relative independence of the two
spheres.
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One can see that this framework has allowed us to describe the current crisis and
provides some explanation of the structural limits of the expansion of the industry. What
the framework cannot foretell is whether the present crisis is so deep that it will put an end
to the current regime.
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